Blogs
Some days ago I read the post about Joe Security's error when they analyzed an Andromeda sample and I also found new samples of this Trojan. Then I decided that I should write something about it. At least, just to remember some tricks of Andromeda for the next time and not starting from scratch. I'm Dory, I forget things ;)
When I analyzed this malware some months ago I thought that it was quite interesting due to the Anti-debugging and Anti-VM tricks it uses. You can also find references to the same malware with the name of Gamarue. It seems it is cool to rename the same malware with different names. Then you can find some families with three different names, like Cridex / Feodo / Bugat. Anyway, I also found these two links with very good and detailed information about analyzing Andromeda:
Submitted by jesparza on Sun, 2013/09/01 - 19:56
As I already announced in the last blog post, I was in Las Vegas giving a workshop about how to analyze exploit kits and PDF documents at BlackHat. The part related to exploit kits included some tips to analyze obfuscated Javascript code manually and obtain the exploit URLs or/and shellcodes. The tools needed to accomplish this task were just a text editor, a Javascript engine like Spidermonkey, Rhino or PyV8, and some tool to beautify the code (like peepdf ;p). In a generic way, we can say that the steps to analyze an exploit kit page are the following:
- Removing unnecessary HTML tags
- Convert HTML elements which are called in the Javascript code to Javascript variables
- Find and replace eval functions with prints, for example, or hook the eval function if it is possible (PyV8)
- Execute the Javascript code
- Beautify the code
- Find shellcodes and exploit URLs
- Repeat if necessary
Submitted by jesparza on Sun, 2013/08/18 - 22:14
BlackHat USA 2013 is here and tomorrow I will be explaining how to analyze exploit kits and PDF documents in my workshop “PDF Attack: From the Exploit Kit to the Shellcode” from 14:15 to 16:30 in the Florentine room. It will be really practical so bring your laptop and expect a practical session ;) All you need is a Linux distribution with pylibemu and PyV8 installed to join the party. You can run all on Windows too if you prefer.
Now Spidermonkey is not needed because I decided to change the Javascript engine to PyV8, it really works better. Take a look at the automatic analysis of the Javascript code using Spidermonkey (left) and PyV8 (right).
Submitted by jesparza on Wed, 2013/07/31 - 12:40
Just some hours after the bombings during the Boston Marathon we already had several spam campaigns using that subject to infect users. It seems that cybercriminals don't respect anything, did we really expect something different? :p
On the past Wednesday I received four emails talking about the Boston incident. They were really suspicious, just a URL in the body, the URLs had just an IP instead of a good domain...I think someone was in a rush trying to profit from this as soon as possible, while it was still on the news...
The subjects were:
BREAKING - Boston Marathon Explosion
Explosion at the Boston Marathon
Aftermath to explosion at Boston Marathon
Explosions at the Boston Marathon
And the URLs I saw:
hxxp://94.28.49 .130/boston.html
hxxp://78.90.133 .133/boston.html
hxxp://118.141.37 .122/news.html
hxxp://110.92.80 .47/news.html
These URLs leaded to a simple webpage with six iframes. Five of them pointed to real videos about the tragedy and the other one redirected to a RedKit exploit kit which was trying to exploit a CVE-2012-1723 Java vulnerability (take a look at the vulnerability explanation). Also, a Meta Refresh Tag was leading to this URL:
Submitted by jesparza on Sun, 2013/04/21 - 21:50
After lunch it was Sergey Bratus and Travis Goodspeed's turn to speak about the security of USB ports, telling how it is possible to compromise the whole system via a unattended USB port. This was a really interesting talk that one can explore by himself taking a look at some good documentation on Travis' blog.
The talk “We Came In Peace – They Don’t: Hackers vs. CyberWar” by FX was next. He gave his opinion about the actual cyberwarfare and the difference between the point of view of Governments and cybersecurity experts about this subject. Some ideas from his talk: avoid the use of 0-days as weapons through Full-Disclosure, learn how to protect you playing CTFs and don't give up.
Submitted by jesparza on Sun, 2013/04/07 - 14:16
Until now I had not had enough time to write about my experience at my first Troopers. Due to some good comments about it I had had in mind going to Troopers since some time ago, but for one reason or another I hadn't been able to do it. Last year I had the opportunity to share table with Enno Rey, Troopers organizer and CEO of ERNW, at BlackHat Europe. That time I saw they were a good team and good people, and this year, living closer to Heidelberg, I had no excuses to go. I arrived in Heidelberg at 3:30AM after 9 hours on the road due to the bad weather conditions. I was able to rest to be ready for the talks in the next morning. I missed the keynote by Rodrigo Branco, but I heard that it was really good. The first talk I attended was “Paparazzi over IP” by Daniel Mende and Pascal Turbing about hacking a CANON camera, equipped with a wireless adapter and other features. The result was that it was possible to see all the photographs taken, control the device remotely and intercept the images while they were about to be sent to a cloud storage.
Submitted by jesparza on Sun, 2013/04/07 - 13:52
After reading the Eurograbber report and taking into account that there were a lot of similarities with Sopelka Botnet, which I had analyzed some months before, I decided to write a blog post about it. At the same moment, the Rooted CON CFP was closing, so I submitted this subject and then I forced myself to research further to demonstrate that Eurograbber was just a hype. Thanks to the investigations by S21sec and Fox-IT there was more than enough information.
Submitted by jesparza on Mon, 2013/04/01 - 21:25
More than one month ago I gave a presentation about the NFC credit cards privacy at No cON Name (NcN), a well known Spanish security conference. It's not a new subject and, also, some researchers presented talks about it in other conferences during this year, but, until that moment, there were no proofs of concept with Spanish credit cards (at least public ones). You can take a look at the presentation here (Spanish).
As I have mentioned in some posts about this subject, NFC payments are a normal part of life in some Asiatic countries, like Japan. However, this technology has arrived this year to Spain and other European countries, supported by banks, mostly. The result is that a person could have an NFC credit card in his wallet without even knowing it. It wouldn't be a problem if data were correctly protected, but we can't assume anything in the security world and this is another proof of that.
Submitted by jesparza on Fri, 2012/12/21 - 15:51
Apart of being new or not (I think all of us thought that we were the first ones when really not), the report throws some data about affected banks/users and, the most important, the amounts stolen from each country by the fraudsters: more than 16 million EUR in Italy, almost 13 million EUR in Germany, almost 6 million EUR in Spain and more than 1 million EUR in Netherlands. In summary, more than 36 million EUR in Europe. Taking into account the sad times we are living in, crisis times, it's pretty noteworthy, isn't it?
This report and, above all, these stolen amounts have been quickly published everywhere and are quite widespread, faster than some of the most infamous Trojans. That's why I would like to say some words about the report and these astonishing amounts:
- It's not a new Trojan, not a new customized ZeuS, it's just Citadel. Citadel, but also Tatanga and Feodo. In this botnet were used at least three different Trojans.
Submitted by jesparza on Fri, 2012/12/07 - 19:26
Sopelka botnet started life in May this year and was taken down by end of September. It has been called Sopelka because of the path used in the distribution of binaries and configuration files, and was an odd mixture of variants of the known banking trojans Tatanga, Feodo and Citadel.
This botnet’s objective was the collection of banking credentials from European entities, mostly banks from Spain and Germany, but also Holland, Italy and Malta. In addition, it made use of different mobile components for Android, BlackBerry and Symbian phones. Symbian was the first operating system where this type of malicious component emerged two years ago.
During the botnet’s lifetime there were at least five campaigns and it’s likely that more were carried out. Of the five known campaigns, three of them installed variants of Citadel (versions 1.3.4.0 and 1.3.4.5), another Feodo, and Tatanga was the chosen trojan in the other one. All the Citadel campaigns carried the name “sopelka” (a flute type in Russian) in their download paths for binaries and configuration files, but this was not the case with Tatanga and Feodo.
Submitted by jesparza on Wed, 2012/10/17 - 18:00
So the main new features, besides the fixed bugs, are the following:
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Added support for AES in the decryption process: Until now peepdf supported RC4 as a decryption algorithm but AES was a must. Now here it is, so no more worries for decrypted documents. I will be ready for new changes in the decryption process, someone in Vegas told me that the next AES modification for PDF files is coming...
Submitted by jesparza on Sun, 2012/08/05 - 17:06
Here I'm going to focus on the URI records and their possibilities to perform actions in NFC capable mobile phones when reading this type of tags. The URI specification says that these are the supported schemes:
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URI Identifier Codes
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Schemes
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Submitted by jesparza on Sat, 2012/06/30 - 20:42
NFC is based on the ISO/IEC 18092 standard, published at the end of 2003, and it's compatible with other standards like ISO/IEC 14443 A/B (RFID) and ISO/IEC 15693 (FeliCa - Sony). As probably you know, it's a short distance wireless technology (normally < 10cm), high frequency (13'56 MHz) and low speed (normally until 424 Kbps). Unlike RFID, NFC is capable to perform bidirectional communications, and the time to establish the communication is much lower than using Bluetooth.
The aim of this blog post is not explaining how NFC works but giving some advice to setup a lab and start playing with this technology. The first thing we need is a NFC reader/writer. After looking around the most used are the following:
Submitted by jesparza on Mon, 2012/06/04 - 00:21
We can identify two known vulnerabilities and it seems that object 30 contains Javascript code. If we take a look at the filters used in this stream we see that peepdf has been able to decode the /CCITTFaxDecode filter without problems:
Submitted by jesparza on Mon, 2012/04/23 - 00:55
Last week I presented the last version of peepdf in the Black Hat Europe Arsenal. It was a really good experience that I hope I can continue doing in the future ;) Since the very first version, almost one year ago, I had not released any new version but I have been frequently updating the project SVN. Now you can download the new version with some interesting additions (and bugfixes), and take a look at the overview of the tool in the slides. I think it's important to mention that the version included in the Black Hat CD and the one in the Black Hat Arsenal webpage IS NOT the last version, this IS the last version. I've asked the Black Hat stuff to change the version on the site so I hope this can be fixed soon.
Submitted by jesparza on Sat, 2012/03/24 - 14:35
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