More than one month ago I gave a presentation about the NFC credit cards privacy at No cON Name (NcN), a well known Spanish security conference. It's not a new subject and, also, some researchers presented talks about it in other conferences during this year, but, until that moment, there were no proofs of concept with Spanish credit cards (at least public ones). You can take a look at the presentation here (Spanish).
As I have mentioned in some posts about this subject, NFC payments are a normal part of life in some Asiatic countries, like Japan. However, this technology has arrived this year to Spain and other European countries, supported by banks, mostly. The result is that a person could have an NFC credit card in his wallet without even knowing it. It wouldn't be a problem if data were correctly protected, but we can't assume anything in the security world and this is another proof of that.
Submitted by jesparza on Fri, 2012/12/21 - 15:51
Apart of being new or not (I think all of us thought that we were the first ones when really not), the report throws some data about affected banks/users and, the most important, the amounts stolen from each country by the fraudsters: more than 16 million EUR in Italy, almost 13 million EUR in Germany, almost 6 million EUR in Spain and more than 1 million EUR in Netherlands. In summary, more than 36 million EUR in Europe. Taking into account the sad times we are living in, crisis times, it's pretty noteworthy, isn't it?
This report and, above all, these stolen amounts have been quickly published everywhere and are quite widespread, faster than some of the most infamous Trojans. That's why I would like to say some words about the report and these astonishing amounts:
- It's not a new Trojan, not a new customized ZeuS, it's just Citadel. Citadel, but also Tatanga and Feodo. In this botnet were used at least three different Trojans.
Submitted by jesparza on Fri, 2012/12/07 - 19:26
botnet started life in May this year and was taken down by end of September. It has been called Sopelka
because of the path used in the distribution of binaries and configuration files, and was an odd mixture of variants of the known banking trojans Tatanga, Feodo and Citadel.
This botnet’s objective was the collection of banking credentials from European entities, mostly banks from Spain and Germany, but also Holland, Italy and Malta. In addition, it made use of different mobile components for Android, BlackBerry and Symbian phones. Symbian was the first operating system where this type of malicious component emerged two years ago.
During the botnet’s lifetime there were at least five campaigns and it’s likely that more were carried out. Of the five known campaigns, three of them installed variants of Citadel (versions 18.104.22.168 and 22.214.171.124), another Feodo, and Tatanga was the chosen trojan in the other one. All the Citadel campaigns carried the name “sopelka” (a flute type in Russian) in their download paths for binaries and configuration files, but this was not the case with Tatanga and Feodo.
Submitted by jesparza on Wed, 2012/10/17 - 18:00
Recently our e-crime unit has detected a new banking trojan, named as Tatanga
, with Man in the Browser (MitB) functions affecting banks in Spain, United Kingdom, Germany and Portugal. Like SpyEye
, it can perform automatic transactions, retrieving the mules from a server and spoofing the real balance and banking operations of the users. Its detection rate
is very low, and the few antivirus engines that can detect it yield a generic result.
The trojan in question is rather sophisticated. It is written in C++ and uses rootkit techniques to conceal its presence, though on occasion, its files are visible. The trojan downloads a number of encrypted modules (DLLs), which are decrypted in memory when injected to the browser or other processes to avoid detection by antivirus software. The modules are the following:
Coredb: It manages the trojan's configuration. The corresponding file is encrypted with the algorithm 3DES.
Comm Support Library: This module implements the encryption of the communication between the trojan and the control panel.
File Patcher: The function of this module is not clear yet. It is suspected that it is in charge of the propagation across folders containing multimedia, zipped or executable files.
- ModEmailGrabber: It gathers e-mail addresses.
Submitted by jesparza on Tue, 2011/03/08 - 18:00
This past month a new DHL campaign has been spreading malware in a zip file. The executable in the zip was identified (with a high detection
rate) as Oficla
by the Antivirus engines. This malicious code, with filename DHL_Etiqueta.exe
, acts as a downloader asking a server the URLs it must use to download the other malicious files. It always uses in the requests the User-Agent Opera\9.64
. These are the requests and responses in this case:
Both of the downloaded files, morph.exe and esmilk.exe, are banking trojans. The former is a sample of Feodo, with a low detection rate (7/41), which downloads the configuration file from a server after sending to it a POST request:
Submitted by jesparza on Wed, 2010/11/03 - 00:55
One month ago David Barroso
visited one online banking user. David extracted one file from his mobile phone and I picked some ZeuS files up from his computer.This was the starting point of the so-called ZeuS MitMo
When ZeuS injects HTML code it usually asks the user for the necessary TANs in order to carry out a fraudulent transaction, but sometimes this information is not enough. Some banks ask for an additional code, sent by SMS, that the user (or criminal) must enter to finish the process. Until that moment this type of authentication (two-factor authentication) was successful, but not since then. This ZeuS gang had modified the configuration files to ask for the mobile phone number too. It's not so strange, but yes using it to commit the fraud. They sent to him an SMS with a link inside, telling the user that he should install that "certificate". When the user installed it, the malicious application
began to monitor all the incoming SMSs, looking for the bank SMS and forwarding it to the criminals. This way they already had all the information they needed to make the transaction, game over.
Apart of asking for the user phone number the configuration file had other curious things. When the user visited the online banking URL ZeuS added an script element to the legitimate web page pointing to an URL, avoiding to store all the HTML code in the config file. But this is not the strange thing, it's that normally the src attribute it's an absolute URL while in this case was a relative one:
Submitted by jesparza on Thu, 2010/10/28 - 20:19
Recently our e-crime team has discovered
that Spyeye is using Man in the Browser (MitB) techniques in order to make fraudulent transactions. Thanks to MitB cybercriminals can make the transactions in the same banking online session as the real user, therefore they can do it in a quickly and clean way. I say clean because in the logs of the online banking application there won't be more IPs than the real user ones. It means less proofs in an hypothetical court against the bad guys, for example.
- When the user goes to the accounts details screen the information (account number, type of account and balance) of all of them are grabbed and sent to the malicious server in a serialized array:
["maxCheck" = ["name" = "MY_ACCOUNT_NAME",
"check" = "MY_ACCOUNT_NUMBER",
"sum" = $$$],
"allChecks" = [ 0 = ["name" = "MY_ACCOUNT_NAME",
"check" = "MY_ACCOUNT_NUMBER",
"sum" = $$$]
- From all the possible accounts it's chosen like preferred the one with more money (maxCheck array).
Submitted by jesparza on Mon, 2010/10/25 - 00:38