PDF Attack: A Journey from the Exploit Kit to the Shellcode (Slides)

As I already announced in the last blog post, I was in Las Vegas giving a workshop about how to analyze exploit kits and PDF documents at BlackHat. The part related to exploit kits included some tips to analyze obfuscated Javascript code manually and obtain the exploit URLs or/and shellcodes. The tools needed to accomplish this task were just a text editor, a Javascript engine like Spidermonkey, Rhino or PyV8, and some tool to beautify the code (like peepdf ;p). In a generic way, we can say that the steps to analyze an exploit kit page are the following:
 

  • Removing unnecessary HTML tags
  • Convert HTML elements which are called in the Javascript code to Javascript variables
  • Find and replace eval functions with prints, for example, or hook the eval function if it is possible (PyV8)
  • Execute the Javascript code
  • Beautify the code
  • Find shellcodes and exploit URLs
  • Repeat if necessary

 

 

PDF Attack: A Journey from the Exploit Kit to the Shellcode

 
BlackHat USA 2013 is here and tomorrow I will be explaining how to analyze exploit kits and PDF documents in my workshop “PDF Attack: From the Exploit Kit to the Shellcode” from 14:15 to 16:30 in the Florentine room. It will be really practical so bring your laptop and expect a practical session ;) All you need is a Linux distribution with pylibemu and PyV8 installed to join the party. You can run all on Windows too if you prefer.

Now Spidermonkey is not needed because I decided to change the Javascript engine to PyV8, it really works better. Take a look at the automatic analysis of the Javascript code using Spidermonkey (left) and PyV8 (right).
 

 

The Boston Marathon bombings, RedKit and a malware zoo

Just some hours after the bombings during the Boston Marathon we already had several spam campaigns using that subject to infect users. It seems that cybercriminals don't respect anything, did we really expect something different? :p

On the past Wednesday I received four emails talking about the Boston incident. They were really suspicious, just a URL in the body, the URLs had just an IP instead of a good domain...I think someone was in a rush trying to profit from this as soon as possible, while it was still on the news...
 

 
The subjects were:
 

BREAKING - Boston Marathon Explosion 
Explosion at the Boston Marathon
Aftermath to explosion at Boston Marathon
Explosions at the Boston Marathon

 
And the URLs I saw:
 

hxxp://94.28.49 .130/boston.html 
hxxp://78.90.133 .133/boston.html
hxxp://118.141.37 .122/news.html
hxxp://110.92.80 .47/news.html

 
These URLs leaded to a simple webpage with six iframes. Five of them pointed to real videos about the tragedy and the other one redirected to a RedKit exploit kit which was trying to exploit a CVE-2012-1723 Java vulnerability (take a look at the vulnerability explanation). Also, a Meta Refresh Tag was leading to this URL:
 

Troopers13 conference - Day 2

I started the second day with the Marcus Niemietz's talk “UI Redressing Attacks on Android Devices” about the chances to cheat on the users using hidden layers to perform unwanted actions. After this, another mobile subject, Peter Kieserberg shared his ideas about the use of QR codes as a vector attack.

After lunch it was Sergey Bratus and Travis Goodspeed's turn to speak about the security of USB ports, telling how it is possible to compromise the whole system via a unattended USB port. This was a really interesting talk that one can explore by himself taking a look at some good documentation on Travis' blog.

 

 

The talk “We Came In Peace – They Don’t: Hackers vs. CyberWar” by FX was next. He gave his opinion about the actual cyberwarfare and the difference between the point of view of Governments and cybersecurity experts about this subject. Some ideas from his talk: avoid the use of 0-days as weapons through Full-Disclosure, learn how to protect you playing CTFs and don't give up.
 

Troopers13 conference - Day 1

Until now I had not had enough time to write about my experience at my first Troopers. Due to some good comments about it I had had in mind going to Troopers since some time ago, but for one reason or another I hadn't been able to do it. Last year I had the opportunity to share table with Enno Rey, Troopers organizer and CEO of ERNW, at BlackHat Europe. That time I saw they were a good team and good people, and this year, living closer to Heidelberg, I had no excuses to go.

I arrived in Heidelberg at 3:30AM after 9 hours on the road due to the bad weather conditions. I was able to rest to be ready for the talks in the next morning. I missed the keynote by Rodrigo Branco, but I heard that it was really good. The first talk I attended was “Paparazzi over IP” by Daniel Mende and Pascal Turbing about hacking a CANON camera, equipped with a wireless adapter and other features. The result was that it was possible to see all the photographs taken, control the device remotely and intercept the images while they were about to be sent to a cloud storage.

 

 

Sopelka VS Eurograbber: really 36 million EUR?

Almost one month ago I had the opportunity of giving a talk at Rooted CON for yet another year. Mikel Gastesi and me talked about Sopelka Botnet and the Eurograbber report published by Check Point and Versafe at the beginning of December 2012. You can take a look at the slides here.

 

 

After reading the Eurograbber report and taking into account that there were a lot of similarities with Sopelka Botnet, which I had analyzed some months before, I decided to write a blog post about it. At the same moment, the Rooted CON CFP was closing, so I submitted this subject and then I forced myself to research further to demonstrate that Eurograbber was just a hype. Thanks to the investigations by S21sec and Fox-IT there was more than enough information.

Give me your credit card, the NFC way

More than one month ago I gave a presentation about the NFC credit cards privacy at No cON Name (NcN), a well known Spanish security conference. It's not a new subject and, also, some researchers presented talks about it in other conferences during this year, but, until that moment, there were no proofs of concept with Spanish credit cards (at least public ones). You can take a look at the presentation here (Spanish).

 

 

As I have mentioned in some posts about this subject, NFC payments are a normal part of life in some Asiatic countries, like Japan. However, this technology has arrived this year to Spain and other European countries, supported by banks, mostly. The result is that a person could have an NFC credit card in his wallet without even knowing it. It wouldn't be a problem if data were correctly protected, but we can't assume anything in the security world and this is another proof of that.

Uncovering the "new" Eurograbber: really 36 million EUR?

Eurograbber is in the news, beware. Some days ago Versafe and Check Point Software Technologies published a “new” threat report titled “A Case Study of Eurograbber: How 36 Million Euros was Stolen via Malware”. A bit sensationalist, yes. If it was well documented and there was real proof of that, I would have nothing to say, but it turns out that this threat is not so new and I wrote about it by the end of September, when I was working at S21sec. I called this Sopelka botnet.

Apart of being new or not (I think all of us thought that we were the first ones when really not), the report throws some data about affected banks/users and, the most important, the amounts stolen from each country by the fraudsters: more than 16 million EUR in Italy, almost 13 million EUR in Germany, almost 6 million EUR in Spain and more than 1 million EUR in Netherlands. In summary, more than 36 million EUR in Europe. Taking into account the sad times we are living in, crisis times, it's pretty noteworthy, isn't it?

This report and, above all, these stolen amounts have been quickly published everywhere and are quite widespread, faster than some of the most infamous Trojans. That's why I would like to say some words about the report and these astonishing amounts:

 

  • It's not a new Trojan, not a new customized ZeuS, it's just Citadel. Citadel, but also Tatanga and Feodo. In this botnet were used at least three different Trojans.
     

Sopelka Botnet: three banking trojans and one banking panel

Sopelka botnet started life in May this year and was taken down by end of September. It has been called Sopelka because of the path used in the distribution of binaries and configuration files, and was an odd mixture of variants of the known banking trojans Tatanga, Feodo and Citadel.

This botnet’s objective was the collection of banking credentials from European entities, mostly banks from Spain and Germany, but also Holland, Italy and Malta. In addition, it made use of different mobile components for Android, BlackBerry and Symbian phones. Symbian was the first operating system where this type of malicious component emerged two years ago.

During the botnet’s lifetime there were at least five campaigns and it’s likely that more were carried out. Of the five known campaigns, three of them installed variants of Citadel (versions 1.3.4.0 and 1.3.4.5), another Feodo, and Tatanga was the chosen trojan in the other one. All the Citadel campaigns carried the name “sopelka” (a flute type in Russian) in their download paths for binaries and configuration files, but this was not the case with Tatanga and Feodo.

New peepdf v0.2 (Black Hat Vegas version)

Last week I was in Vegas presenting the new release of peepdf, version 0.2. Since my release at Black Hat Amsterdam some months ago I hadn't created a new package so it was time to do it. You can now download the new package here or use “peepdf -u” to update it to the latest version.

 

 
So the main new features, besides the fixed bugs, are the following:

  • Added support for AES in the decryption process: Until now peepdf supported RC4 as a decryption algorithm but AES was a must. Now here it is, so no more worries for decrypted documents. I will be ready for new changes in the decryption process, someone in Vegas told me that the next AES modification for PDF files is coming...

 

 

Checking if reading an NFC tag is that secure

As I mentioned in my last post about NFC, we can use NFC Forum tags to store and share information, normally used by marketing departments. This information must have a specific format called NDEF (NFC Data Exchange Format). Thanks to this format different NFC devices can share NDEF messages between them. Each of these messages can store several NDEF records containing different type of information like plain text, images, audio or video (media in general), URIs, etc. You can take a look at the NDEF specification to learn more about it.

 

 

Here I'm going to focus on the URI records and their possibilities to perform actions in NFC capable mobile phones when reading this type of tags. The URI specification says that these are the supported schemes:

 

URI Identifier Codes

Schemes

How to setup your own NFC lab

NFC is a reality today. A lot of cities in the world want to add this technology to their daily life, using it for transport, payments, access systems and almost all we can think (in some countries, like Japan and Korea, NFC is used years ago). Even reading NFC tags can be used to perform certain actions in our mobile phones like put it in flight mode, synchronize data, etc.

 

 

NFC is based on the ISO/IEC 18092 standard, published at the end of 2003, and it's compatible with other standards like ISO/IEC 14443 A/B (RFID) and ISO/IEC 15693 (FeliCa - Sony). As probably you know, it's a short distance wireless technology (normally < 10cm), high frequency (13'56 MHz) and low speed (normally until 424 Kbps). Unlike RFID, NFC is capable to perform bidirectional communications, and the time to establish the communication is much lower than using Bluetooth.

The aim of this blog post is not explaining how NFC works but giving some advice to setup a lab and start playing with this technology. The first thing we need is a NFC reader/writer. After looking around the most used are the following:

 

peepdf supports CCITTFaxDecode encoded streams

Stream filters, as I said some time ago, are a good way of obfuscating PDF files and hide Javascript code, for instance. Some weeks ago a post related to the use of the /CCITTFaxDecode filter was published by Sophos, although the Malware Tracker guys tracked a similar document created more than one year ago. Bad guys were using the /CCITTFaxDecode filter with some parameters to obfuscate the documents and try to bypass analysis tools and Antivirus. This filter was not supported by peepdf until the moment, so Binjo ported the Origami decoder to Python to include it (Thanks man!). Today I have uploaded the code and now peepdf also supports this filter :)

I've performed a quick analysis of the Sophos' document (6cc2a162e08836f7d50d461a9fc136fe) and it seems to work well:

 

 

We can identify two known vulnerabilities and it seems that object 30 contains Javascript code. If we take a look at the filters used in this stream we see that peepdf has been able to decode the /CCITTFaxDecode filter without problems:

 

New version of peepdf (v0.1 r92 - Black Hat Europe Arsenal 2012)

Last week I presented the last version of peepdf in the Black Hat Europe Arsenal. It was a really good experience that I hope I can continue doing in the future ;) Since the very first version, almost one year ago, I had not released any new version but I have been frequently updating the project SVN. Now you can download the new version with some interesting additions (and bugfixes), and take a look at the overview of the tool in the slides. I think it's important to mention that the version included in the Black Hat CD and the one in the Black Hat Arsenal webpage IS NOT the last version, this IS the last version. I've asked the Black Hat stuff to change the version on the site so I hope this can be fixed soon.
 

Sex, Exploit Kits and Ransomware

Each of us has his own preferences: some people love Lady Gaga or Justin Bieber, others Rocco Siffredi or Laura Lion. The love for the latter can be dangerous if you are not aware of security problems when you have a non-updated system, and it's possible you end with an infected system asking for money to recover the control of the machine.

 

 

This was an interesting situation so I tried to help my friend. In this case, just after the desktop appeared, a full-screen window showed. It was a warning from the Spanish police ("Cuerpo Nacional de Policía") saying that the system had been blocked because it had been used to perpetrate illegal actions like child pornography, terrorism and violence against children: "Fue detectado un caso de actividad ilegal. El sistema operativo fue bloqueado por violación de las leyes de España!". A warning like this can be shocking for a normal user, so social engineering was working here. However, this warning was also asking for 100€ to be paid via Ukash or Paysafecard as a fine for this behaviour and in order to restore the system. This part can be a bit strange and maybe makes the victims call the police very quickly. Once this window appeared no other action was possible, like execute the Task Manager or return to the desktop, just enter a code to pay.

 

 

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